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HARVEY V BEVERIDGE: COMMON 
INTENTION CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS IN 
NEW ZEALAND?  
Mark Bennett* 
This article discusses the reasoning of the High Court and Court of Appeal in Harvey v Beveridge 
in respect of the existence of "common intention constructive trusts" in New Zealand law. It 
analyses the development of constructive trusts doctrine in New Zealand, and argues that a different 
approach was taken to the application of this doctrine in relationship property disputes compared 
with the equivalent English doctrine. This difference was not recognised in Harvey v Beveridge, and 
it is argued that an adequate understanding of this difference requires us to grapple with the 
underlying foundations of the New Zealand law, which were left open during the Court of Appeal's 
development of the doctrine.  
I INTRODUCTION 
In what circumstances, and for what reasons, can you make a legally recognised claim of rights 
to property that you are not the legal owner of? This is an important question in many people's lives, 
and one that a legal system should provide clear answers to. The law relating to constructive trusts 
provides one answer to this question, but while the main categories are relatively clear, the doctrinal 
basis for such trusts in the context of relationship property is uncertain.1 This article considers the 
answer to this question that has been given in recent New Zealand judicial analysis of the law 
relating to constructive trusts in the recent Harvey v Beveridge decisions of the High Court and 
Court of Appeal,2 in which a claim to equitable ownership of a residential property was considered 
  
*  Victoria University of Wellington School of Law. I wish to thank Tony Angelo, Graeme Austin and an 
anonymous reviewer for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I thank Bill Atkin for the same, as 
well as for his guidance and friendship over 20 years, in the classroom, as a colleague and on the cricket 
pitch. 
1  See for example Halsbury's Law of Canada (online ed, 2011) "Trusts" at [HTR-44]; Donovan WM Waters, 
Mark Gillen and Lionel D Smith (eds) Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada (4th ed, Carswell, Toronto, 2012) at 
[11.I]; and Robert Chambers "Constructive Trusts in Canada" (1999) 37 Alta L Rev 173.  
2  Harvey v Beveridge [2013] NZHC 1718, [2013] NZAR 1364 [Harvey (HC)]; and Harvey v Beveridge 
[2014] NZCA 72, (2014) 29 FRNZ 539 [Harvey (CA)]. 
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by reference to the doctrine of "common intention constructive trust". This article analyses the 
courts' reasoning in light of the historical development of the doctrine and suggests how it could be 
further clarified.  
II PROFESSOR ATKIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO FAMILY 
PROPERTY SCHOLARSHIP 
Another impetus for this article is the desire to pay tribute to Professor Bill Atkin on the 
occasion of his 40th year at Victoria University of Wellington's Faculty of Law. The article's subject 
matter is fitting given that Professor Atkin spent much of that time enlightening law students and the 
legal community on the developing law of family property and family law in general – ultimately 
becoming one of the leading New Zealand authorities on family law.  He began his career here just 
before the passage of the landmark Matrimonial Property Act 1976, which entrenched the concept 
of equal sharing of family property,3 and over the years he has seen social and legislative mores 
change to the extent that the family property regime was in most parts extended to "de facto" 
relationships in 2001.4 Indeed, Professor Atkin's scholarship clearly influenced these changes,5 for 
example as a member of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection.6 
These developments in the statutory family property regime make the law discussed in this article – 
equity's contribution to regulating property relations within close personal relationships – less 
important in determining entitlements to property after the relationship had ended. Yet this law is 
still applicable in a number of situations, and the decisions in Harvey demonstrate that both its 
doctrinal nature and its relationship with English authority is still not entirely clear.  
This specific question was analysed by Professor Atkin in the early 1990s, in a book on the law 
relating to Living Together Without Marriage.7 At that time, one of the key issues in that area – 
ownership of property – was not regulated by the statutory regime that applies today, but by the 
general law. Indeed, Professor Atkin noted that "the tail has wagged the dog" in the sense that cases 
involving de facto partners had significantly impacted the development of the general law in areas 
  
3  See Bill Atkin and others "Fifty Years of New Zealand Family Law" (2013) 25 NZULR 645 at 662. See 
also Anthony H Angelo and Bill Atkin "A Conceptual and Structural Overview of the Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976" (1977) 7 NZULR 237. 
4  Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001. See the initial analysis of this legislation in the 2001 edition 
of Bill Atkin and Wendy Parker Relationship Property in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2001). 
5   Bill Atkin "Family Property Law Reform" in Bill Atkin, Graeme Austin and Virginia Grainer (eds) Family 
Property Law & Policy (New Zealand Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review, Wellington, 1995) 77. 
6  Report of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection (Department of Justice, 
Wellington, 1988); and Bill Atkin "More law reform: the report of the Working Group on Matrimonial 
Property and Family Protection October 1988)" (1989) 2 FLB 18. 
7  Bill Atkin Living Together Without Marriage: The Law in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991). 
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such as trusts and estoppel, as the courts had attempted to "stretch and mould concepts to do justice 
between the parties".8 The analysis sat between the old English jurisprudence of common intention 
and the new test of reasonable expectations propounded by the Court of Appeal under (then) 
President Cooke;9 the traditional analysis was being doubted by academic commentators, and 
although the New Zealand judges were "by no means unanimous" in their "precise method for 
resolving de facto cases", Professor Atkin observed that:10  
… there may be little advantage in keeping the different categories of trust … In de facto cases, the 
traditional cases, it is today argued, focus attention on the wrong things, and, instead, there should be a 
new kind of analysis which is more suited to modern-day needs. 
This was a prescient observation, coming before the canonical restatement of the reasonable 
expectations approach a few years later in Lankow v Rose,11 the decision that confirmed the move 
away from the English common intentions approach. As Professor Atkin later observed, the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal "carved out its own formula", allowing a more liberal approach to 
recognising equitable rights.12 His view then was that, on first glance, the reasonable expectations 
test appears "to offer a just and tolerably clear way of tackling property disputes of de facto 
partners".13 However he cautioned that the law had become far from certain, and the success of a 
claim and the quantification of the award has not been easy to predict.14 Nevertheless in 2004 we 
heard no phantoms of common intention15 rattling their chains in Professor Atkin's discussion, and 
saw no reference to English authority; given the shift in approach of New Zealand courts, none was 
necessary.  
Yet a decade later, in the recent decisions in Harvey, we seem to see a return to the language of 
the "common intention constructive trust" (CICT), and reference to the old and new English cases; 
the impression that one gains on first glance is that the English approach to these issues is alive and 
well and an alternative to the New Zealand "reasonable expectations constructive trust" (RECT). In 
Harvey, a man claimed rights in his friend's residential property, which he said had been given to 
  
8  At 74. 
9  See the discussion below in Part IV:B: The Express CICT in the Formative Court of Appeal Authorities? 
10  Atkin, above n 7, at 75–76. 
11  Lankow v Rose [1995] 1 NZLR 277 (CA). 
12  Bill Atkin "The Challenge of Unmarried Cohabitation – The New Zealand Response" (2003) 37 Fam LQ 
303 at 306. 
13  At 308. 
14  At 309–310. 
15  Kevin Gray "The Law of Trusts and the Quasi-Matrimonial Home" [1983] CLJ 30 at 33, cited in Hayward v 
Giordani [1983] NZLR 140 (CA) at 144 per Cooke J and Stratulatos v Stratulatos [1988] 2 NZLR 424 
(HC) at 436 per McGechan J. 
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him; however, there was no legal transfer or steps taken to complete such a transfer, no formal 
declaration of trust and no contribution to the property. The High Court nevertheless identified a 
possible claim – enough to prevent summary judgment against the defendant – under the CICT 
approach. On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the CICT approach where there is no 
contribution or detriment, but it did not analyse in detail how it sits in relation to the RECT test. 
It is therefore likely that the revival of the language and concepts of common intention will 
continue until the law is further clarified: soon after it was decided, the High Court decision in 
Harvey was cited favourably in Ridge v Parore, where it was said that CICTs "form a well-
established part of the law of trusts in England and Australia".16 It is argued here, with respect, that 
such a view is misleading in that in recent years, New Zealand courts have been applying neither the 
"extended" idea of the CICT as it exists in England, nor the unconscionability approach used in 
Australia.17 The High Court's decision suggests that the complex, controversial and still-developing 
English CICT approach to the recognition of informal property rights in land, through the 
mechanism of the constructive trust, is applicable here; the Court of Appeal doubted but did not 
reject this.  
However, the continuing existence of the CICT approach in New Zealand would be out of step 
with what happened from the 1970s through the 1990s when this jurisdiction's constructive trusts 
law took a different path than those followed in England and other comparable jurisdictions.18 This 
was a deliberate choice to found constructive trust law in New Zealand in the area of property to 
which a relationship partner has contributed according to the reasonable expectations of a beneficial 
interest.19 No longer would the courts look to infer or impute intentions where there was no clearly 
expressed common intention as to beneficial ownership; instead where the claimant had a 
reasonable expectation of a beneficial interest due to their contribution to the defendant's property, 
the courts would recognise that it would be unconscionable for the defendant not to recognise this 
  
16  Ridge v Parore [2014] NZHC 318 at [19]. 
17  The Australian doctrines in this area are based on the idea of the unconscionability of retaining benefits 
received by the defendant in the context of a joint endeavour that subsequently fails: Muchinski v Dodds 
(1985) 160 CLR 583; Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; Halsbury's Laws of Australia 
(online looseleaf ed, 2015) "Trusts" at [430-620]; and John Mee The Property Rights of Cohabitees (Hart, 
Oxford, 1999) at ch 8, especially at 252–264. Compare with Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [25].  
18  For discussions of the developments over these years, see Bill Atkin Living Together Without Marriage: 
The Law in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) at ch 5; and Mark Henaghan and Nicola Peart 
"Relationship Property Appeals in the New Zealand Court of Appeal 1958-2008: The Elusiveness of 
Equality" in Rick Bigwood (ed) The Permanent New Zealand Court of Appeal: Essays on the First 50 years 
(Hart, Oxford, 2009) 99 at 129–145. 
19  See for example Lankow v Rose, above n 11, at 281–282 per Hardie-Boys J, comparing the alternative 
approaches and stating that one "legal rubric" providing "clear criteria for the imposition of constructive 
trusts in the area of de facto relationships" should be identified. 
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interest.20 There need be no shared agreement or intention for such an interest to exist, nor any 
representation on the part of the defendant: so long as the claimant had contributed and reasonably 
expected an interest, this would be enough.  
The English courts have now arguably reached an almost functionally equivalent test with the 
decisions in Stack v Dowden21 and Jones v Kernott.22 The frank statement in the former case, that 
courts could impute a common intention as to the shares of the beneficial interest in property in light 
of the "whole course of dealing between the parties",23 has replaced the quest to infer such 
intentions in earlier decisions.24 Nevertheless, the point remains: the different approaches for the 
recognition of equitable interests in property as between relationship partners are aiming at similar 
responses to similar circumstances – and they are stated as different doctrines due to judges' 
preferences for that particular statement in terms of the fairness of the substantive result, ease of 
application or avoiding fictions.25 The tests were not meant to sit alongside each other.26 If this 
were not the case, New Zealand law in this area would still be subject to James Mee's embarrassing 
analogy: "It is as if, wanting to look especially well at a party, a guest arrived wearing all her frocks 
at once."27 The better approach is shown in the Canadian Supreme Court's clear restatement of its 
  
20  Hayward v Giordani, above n 15, at 148 per Cooke J; Pasi v Kamana [1986] 1 NZLR 603 (CA) at 605; 
Gillies v Keogh [1989] 2 NZLR 327 (CA) at 330–331 per Cooke P and at 344 and 346–347 per Richardson 
J; Phillips v Phillips [1993] 3 NZLR 159 (CA) at 168 per Cooke P; Lankow v Rose, above n 11, at 281–282 
per Hardie Boys J, at 288 per Gault J and at 293 per Tipping J. 
21  Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432 at [25]. 
22  Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53, [2012] 1 AC 776. 
23  Stack v Dowden, above n 21, at [60]. 
24  See John Mee "Jones v Kernott: Inferring and Imputing in Essex" [2012] Conv 167; Terence Etherton 
"Constructive Trusts: A New Model for Equity and Unjust Enrichment" (2008) 67 CLJ 265; Nick Piska 
"Intention, Fairness and the Presumption of Resulting Trust after Stack v Dowden" (2008) 71 MLR 120; 
Simon Gardner "Family Property Today" (2008) 124 LQR 422 at 427–428; Graham Virgo The Principles of 
Equity and Trusts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 326–329; and Charlie Webb and Tim Akkouh 
Trusts Law (4th ed, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) at 220–224.  
25  See for example Lankow v Rose, above n 11, at 289 per Gault J. 
26  Compare Gault J's statement in Lankow v Rose, above n 11, at 289: "… it is not necessary to choose 
between the various approaches. To adopt one as providing a workable means of dealing with the increasing 
number of cases in this area is not to reject the others. In any case it will be open to a claimant to formulate 
a case on any of the bases so far employed. They will include claims based on contract, express, implied or 
resulting trusts, common intention, unconscionability, estoppel and unjust enrichment." See also David 
Hayton "Constructive Trusts: Is the Remedying of Unjust Enrichment a Satisfactory Approach?" in TG 
Youdan (ed) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, Toronto, 1989) 205 at 239. 
27  Mee, above n 17, at 292. 
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own break with the English common intention approach,28 and New Zealand courts should do the 
same. 
It should be remembered that, for the most part, the law relating to equity's contribution to 
resolving property disputes after the breakdown of de facto relationships has been replaced with the 
general statutory relationship property regime.29 The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 regime for 
division of relationship property applies to de facto relationships that end after or on the day that the 
amendments to the Act came into force on 1 February 2002.30 The law of constructive trusts will 
apply only in a much smaller range of circumstances – but of course still crucially important to the 
parties involved.31 Achieving a coherent and doctrinally sound law of constructive trusts is another 
reason to look further into the decisions and their reasoning. 
III HARVEY V BEVERIDGE 
The decisions in Harvey related to alleged facts concerning the beneficial ownership of a 
residential housing unit that was legally owned by the late Dr Mark Byrd and occupied by his friend 
Ian Beveridge, who claimed an equitable interest in it. Dr Byrd had provided Mr Beveridge with the 
use of a residential unit free of charge.32 When Dr Byrd died, Mr Beveridge claimed that the 
residential unit was his property – that Dr Byrd had given it to him and told him repeatedly that "it is 
yours".33 This was not reflected in Dr Byrd's will, and the executor – Reverend Harvey – gave 
notice to Mr Beveridge to vacate the property, as she was required to do.34 However Mr Beveridge 
refused to do so and lodged a caveat on the title, claiming that the property was his.35  
There were crucial legal problems with this latter claim. Dr Byrd had not legally gifted the 
property to Mr Beveridge, as this would have required registration under the Land Transfer 
system.36 The property was clearly legally owned by the executor, as administrator of the will.37 
  
28  Kerr v Baranow 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 SCR 269 at [21]–[29]. 
29  Jessica Palmer "Constructive Trusts" in Andrew Butler (ed) Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd ed, 
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2009) 335 at [13.2.4]. 
30  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 4C(2).  
31  For discussion of the circumstances where the general law including constructive trusts is still applicable 
despite the partial codification of the law in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, see Nicola Peart "Equity 
in Family Law" in Andrew Butler (ed) Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2009) 1161 at 1168–1179 and 1197–1198. 
32  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [1]. 
33  At [61]–[64]. 
34  Harvey (CA), above n 2, at [43]. 
35  At [3]. 
36  Land Transfer Act 1952, s 41. See Jody L Foster "Title by Registration" in GW Hinde and others Principles 
of Real Property Law (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014) 263 at 268–283. 
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What then about a claim in equity? One obvious equitable ownership claim would be an express 
trust, but there was no written and signed evidence of the declaration of trust – without which an 
express trust is invalid38 under s 25(2) of the Property Law Act 2007. Mr Beveridge needed to 
circumvent this formality, and so argued for the existence of a constructive trust, which is 
specifically excluded from the formality requirement.39 In the High Court, the executor's application 
for summary judgment was rejected because the law was not settled, meaning that a constructive 
trust claim might be made out at trial.40 However, in the Court of Appeal this decision was 
overturned, because no constructive trust claim could have possibly been made out. The divergence 
of these two courts will be explained below.  
A The High Court Decision 
In the High Court decision (Harvey (HC)), the summary judgment application was made by the 
executor Reverend Harvey for possession of the unit and mesne profits relating to Mr Beveridge's 
having remained in the unit after being asked to vacate it. There was also an application to remove 
the caveat that Mr Beveridge had lodged against the title.41  
Because he had not made any significant contribution to the property, Mr Beveridge's claim 
could not rely on Lankow RECT principles or on proprietary estoppel principles.42 Instead, a claim 
based on expressed intentions – a CICT – was identified by counsel, primarily with reference to the 
decision of Fisher J in Cossey v Bach.43 This, Osborne AJ argues, is a different kind of trust than the 
"constructive trust based on expectations" identified in Gillies v Keogh and Lankow.44 The 
Associate Judge observes that New Zealand trusts law texts "universally cover the type of trust in 
Gillies v Keogh based on reasonable expectations".45 The implication is that they are deficient in 
  
37  Administration Act 1969, s 24. 
38  In Laws of New Zealand Trusts at [43], the commentary seems to be taken from Halsbury's Laws of 
England, because it states that writing is only required evidence of the trust. But the English formality 
provision s 52(1)(b) Law of Property Act 1952 (UK), states only that declarations of trust must be 
"manifested and proved by some writing signed by some person who is able to declare such trust or by his 
will", whereas s 25(2) requires that a trust of land "must be created in writing and signed by the settlor". 
Thus the New Zealand formality provision mirrors s 52(1)(c) of the English Law of Property Act 1925 
(UK), which requires that disposition of an existing equitable interest "must be in writing".  
39  Property Law Act 2007, s 25(4)(a). 
40  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [86]. 
41  At [2]. 
42  At [6] and more fully at [38]. 
43  Cossey v Bach [1992] 3 NZLR 612 (HC) at 628. 
44  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [9]. Gillies v Keogh, above n 20; and Lankow v Rose, above n 11. 
45  At [11]. 
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missing another key area of relevant law, the CICT.46 Indeed, later Osborne AJ argues that New 
Zealand texts and commentaries do not spend much time discussing the CICT, in contrast with those 
in Australia and the United Kingdom – the latter stimulated by the continuing importance of 
constructive and resulting trusts in matrimonial property disputes and the recent decisions of Stack 
and Jones.47 The Associate Judge states that no "developed treatment" on the CICT in authority or 
commentary was cited to him.48 
The requirements identified are as follows: 
 First, there must be an unequivocal common intention (that the claimant have a beneficial 
interest in the property).49 "Common" means that the intention must be shared by both 
parties.50 This point is justified with a discussion of the recent English cases.51 The 
Associate Judge notes the puzzle that where there is no formality requirement a valid trust 
will arise simply due to the unilateral intention of the owner of the property.52 However, 
that situation, discussed in Cossey and SM v MH,53 is "by its nature fundamentally different 
to the common intention constructive trust".54 Yet as discussed further below, it is not clear 
why this is so. 
 Osborne AJ then states that the common intention be an actual subjective intention.55 This 
accords with his previous requirement of an express intention derived from unequivocal 
words or conduct. However, by drawing on the English case law, the concept of inferring 
common intention from the parties' conduct is introduced.56  
 The next requirement, discussed exclusively with reference to English authority, is that the 
common intention must be expressed at the time of acquisition of the property, or if there is 
compelling evidence of the intention, or as an exception, the beneficial interest might be 
  
46  At [9]. 
47  At [14].  Stack v Dowden, above n 21; and Jones v Kernott, above n 22. 
48  At [23].  
49  At [26]. 
50  At [27]. 
51  At [28]. 
52  At [30]. 
53  SM v MH HC New Plymouth CIV-2007-443-656, 28 October 2008. 
54  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [30]. 
55  At [38]. 
56  At [39]. 
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intended at some point after acquisition.57 Here is a point where the influence of the 
extended English CICT doctrine seems to be causing problems; characterizing intentions 
occurring after the acquisition as "exceptional" was not part of the developing New Zealand 
RECT jurisprudence, and is no longer the English law relating to CICTs.58  
 Osborne AJ notes that the English CICT has applied predominantly to relationship 
property, particularly the family home.59 However – crucially for Beveridge's case – the 
Associate Judge argues that the English CICT can apply outside personal (romantic) 
relationships,60 and even to commercial relationships. The latter is a controversial point in 
England.61  
 The most controversial requirement of the Associate Judge's CICT test is whether one or 
more of contribution, detriment, reliance or alteration of position on the part of the claimant 
is required.62 Osborne AJ observes that while contribution is required by some 
formulations, this is not found in New Zealand common intention decisions, of which the 
comprehensive analysis set out by Fisher J in Cossey is singled out as important.63  
It is this last point – the discussion of detriment – that is most crucial, because it highlights the 
question of the doctrinal basis for CICTs. This question arises because effectively what has occurred 
in a situation where all of the other requirements obtain is that a trust has been declared, but it is 
invalid due to formality rules for dispositions of land. Where the owner of personal property 
expresses an intention that they are bound to hold it for another's benefit as well, this is an express 
trust regardless of contribution or detriment.64 But in the case of trusts relating to land, the formality 
rule under s 25 of the Property Law Act 2007 makes invalid declarations of trust that are not written 
and signed.65 The formality does not apply to resulting or constructive trusts,66 which by their very 
  
57  At [31]–[33]. 
58  See for example the analysis of changes in intention over time in Jones v Kernott, above n 22, at [48] and 
[51], and the "whole course of dealing" approach in Stack v Dowden, above n 21, at [60]. 
59  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [34]–[35]. 
60  As shown by Osborne AJ's citation of Mollo v Mollo [2000] WTLR 227 (Ch).  
61  For comment see Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, [2012] 2 All ER 754 at 
[85]–[88] per Etherton LJ. See also Terrence Etherton "Constructive Trusts and Proprietary Estoppel: the 
Search for Clarity and Principle" [2009] Conv 104 at 105–115; Nicholas Hopkins "The Pallant v Morgan 
"Equity" – Again: Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd" [2012] Conv 327; and Man Yip "The Pallant v 
Morgan Equity Reconsidered" (2013) 33 LS 549.  
62  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [40]. 
63  At [44]. Cossey v Bach, above n 43. 
64  Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527 (CA); and Rowe v Prance [1999] 2 FLR 787 (Ch). 
65  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [48]. 
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nature arise less intentionally and more informally. Thus the importance of interpreting what looks 
like an (informal) express trust as a constructive trust.  
In Harvey (HC) the Associate Judge agrees with what he takes to be the orthodoxy that such an 
express common intention trust is a constructive trust.67 The well-known problem with this 
orthodoxy is that if what we are dealing with is in substance an informal declaration of trust of land, 
then to bring it into the category of constructive trusts there must be something that makes the 
settlor's not giving effect to the trust unconscionable. Equity does not aid a volunteer;68 exceptions 
include where there is a valid and constituted express trust,69 and where there is some element of 
unconscionability in the defendant's conduct with respect to the claimant that justifies equity's 
intervention.70 Thus a contribution or other detriment seems to logically be required, as Osborne AJ 
notes:71 
I am inclined to the conclusion that such authorities appropriately recognise that, in the absence of such, 
the unconscionability or fraud on the statute which justifies the Court's upholding of constructive trusts 
will be absent. If something in the nature of detriment is not required, it is arguable that the Court would 
be unjustifiably enforcing an express trust which was not documented in writing. 
However, the Associate Judge found that the law in New Zealand was not settled, so that in the 
context of a summary judgment he could not say that detriment was a requirement so as to mean 
that Beveridge's claim was untenable.72 
B The Court of Appeal 
The High Court's decision was overturned in the Court of Appeal decision (Harvey (CA)). After 
noting Osborne AJ had "comprehensively analysed" the concept of the CICT,73 the Court of Appeal 
rejected the applicability of the doctrine to the situation: "None of the authorities relied on … 
supports the proposition that there is any basis [in these circumstances] for a 'common intention' 
  
66  Property Law Act 2007, s 25(2).  
67  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [48]. 
68  Milroy v Lord (1862) 45 ER 1185; Re Rose [1952] 1 Ch 499 (CA); and Pennington v Waine [2002] EWCA 
Civ 227, [2002] 1 WLR 2075 at [52]–[54]. 
69  Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Joliffe (1920) 28 CLR 178 at 187. 
70  Pennington v Waine, above n 68, at [55]–[61]. 
71  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [49]. 
72  At [51]. 
73  Harvey (CA), above n 2, at [27]. 
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constructive trust".74 The Court found issue with both the Associate Judge's application of the law to 
the facts and his statement of the requirements of the CICT.  
In coming to its decision, the Court provided a useful wide-ranging discussion of the general 
area of informal equitable property rights, setting out and then dismissing a number of possible 
arguments for Mr Beveridge having an interest in the property.75 This was necessitated by the 
Court's characterisation of Dr Byrd's (purported) intention as being to gift his property to Mr 
Beveridge, rather than to hold it on trust for him.76 This will bring to most lawyers' minds the 
forceful reminder in Milroy v Lord that transactions must be given the legal meaning that they 
naturally bear;77 as the present Court observes, intention to make a gift cannot be interpreted as an 
intention to declare a trust.78 In any case an express trust would be void for not complying with the 
formality provisions of the Property Law Act 2007.79 Furthermore, as no steps had been taken to 
effect that transfer, there could be no argument that equity should "complete" the gift.80 The Court 
reiterated the corollary point that an incomplete gift can be "revoked" at any time.81  
The Court's discussion of the claimant's CICT argument is relatively brisk in comparison to 
Osborne AJ's. The first of two key paragraphs suggests a distinction between the New Zealand 
authorities in the area and the present claim:82 
None of the authorities involved a claim based on the alleged unconscionability of an executrix in 
implementing the instructions of a will-maker who it is accepted was entitled to resile in his will from 
unimplemented intentions expressed during his lifetime. The authorities were all concerned with the 
requirements for resulting or constructive trusts in the context of relationships that are now covered by 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. It is therefore unnecessary for us to decide in the present case 
  
74  At [45]. 
75  Note that these arguments were apparently not made by counsel nor accepted by Osborne AJ.  See Harvey 
(HC), above n 2, at [3]: "There is a single ground of opposition, namely that Mr Beveridge beneficially 
owned the unit by reason of a common intention constructive trust." 
76  Harvey (CA), above n 2, at [31]. 
77  Milroy v Lord, above n 68. See also T Choithram International SA v Pagarani (British Virgin Islands) 
[2001] 1 WLR 1 (PC).  
78  Harvey (CA), above n 2, at [33]. 
79  Property Law Act 2007 s 25(2): "A trust must be created in writing and signed by the settlor if— (a) it 
relates to land; and (b) it is to take effect in the lifetime of the settlor." 
80  Harvey (CA), above n 2, at [31]. See Scoones v Galvin and the Public Trustee [1934] NZLR 1004 (CA); 
and Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540.  See also Struan Scott and others Adams' Land Transfer (online 
looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [S41.6]. 
81  Harvey (CA), above n 2, at [32]. 
82  At [45]. 
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whether in New Zealand a "common intention" constructive trust should be recognised in the context of 
a different relationship and in the absence of any significant contributions to the value of the property 
concerned or any detriment, that is, any alteration of position in reliance on the expressed intention. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeal is saying that the earlier precedents had different facts 
from the present case, and in the related footnote the Court shows that the authorities cited by the 
High Court were not decided on the CICT doctrine.83 That is of course true, but why should that 
matter if the principles and rules found in the authorities apply to the present situation? If, as 
Osborne AJ claimed, it is arguable that authority such as Cossey allows for a constructive trust 
based on express common intentions, then it is necessary to decide whether that is correct, and 
whether this claim is limited to certain kinds of relationships where there is a contribution or 
detriment. The latter are obviously plausible bases for distinguishing Mr Beveridge's situation from 
those in the other constructive trust decisions, but they are said to be "unnecessary" distinguishing 
bases. However the justification for excluding a constructive trust claim is not identified in the first 
two sentences.  
However, in the next key paragraph the Court of Appeal does distinguish Beveridge's claim 
from those recognised in the authorities, by saying that a contribution to the property by the 
claimant is required before a CICT can be recognised:84 
It is well-established that constructive trusts based on the "reasonable expectations" of the parties do 
require evidence of some contribution, direct or indirect, to the property at issue. We are not at all sure 
that in this context the Associate Judge was right to suggest that a distinction should be drawn between 
constructive trusts based on "reasonable expectations" and "common intention" constructive trusts in 
order to avoid the need for evidence of contribution justifying an order for the transfer of ownership of 
the Unit to Mr Beveridge. The question whether the distinction should be drawn may, however, be left 
to another day given the acknowledgment that at least an element of unconscionability is required for 
both. We observe that, in the absence of any evidence of contribution or any other factor, there would 
appear to be no element of unconscionability sufficient to support the creation of a "common intention" 
constructive trust. 
Put differently, RECTs and CICTs both require contribution or some other reliance that would 
cause detriment to the claimant if the right in the property was not recognised. However, it was the 
contention of Mr Beveridge that under the both the New Zealand and English doctrine of CICTs, the 
fact that the parties had an express common intention about the beneficial ownership of the property 
– even without detriment – means that it would be unconscionable for Ms Harvey not to give effect 
to that beneficial ownership. In other words, the claim is that there is a distinction between CICT 
  
83  At [45], n 27. 
84  At [46]. 
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and RECT in terms of the detriment requirement. That position is not completely implausible, given 
the analysis Osborne AJ provided with reference to considerable authority and reasoning; it requires 
further discussion of authority and principle if it is to be shown to be incorrect. It is therefore useful 
to look more closely at the doctrinal foundations of the law in order to consider whether a 
distinction should be drawn between the CICT and the RECT.  
IV THE ROLES OF THE EXPRESS CICT IN NEW ZEALAND 
A The Place of the Express CICT 
Despite the Court of Appeal's doubts about the express CICT existing alongside RECTs, there is 
both English and New Zealand authority that could be interpreted as supporting such a trust. It 
should be remembered that the idea of an express CICT was theoretically the archetypal case out of 
which the extended CICT and RECT developed, as can be seen in the foundational English 
decisions of Pettitt v Pettitt85 and Gissing v Gissing.86 Further, in another key decision (before the 
recent reformulations in Stack), the express CICT was clearly stated in Lloyd's Bank v Rosset as 
arising if:87  
… independently of any inference to be drawn from the conduct of the parties in the course of sharing 
the house as their home and managing their joint affairs, there has at any time prior to acquisition, or 
exceptionally at some later date, been any agreement, arrangement or understanding reached between 
them that the property is to be shared beneficially. 
While this version of the CICT that gives effect to the express intentions of the parties clearly 
exists in England, it is comparatively uncommon.88 The more prominent situation is where no such 
expressed intention exists, and the courts must decide whether, on the conduct of the parties, an 
inferred or imputed intention can be found; this is the "extended CICT" that goes beyond the actual 
expressed intentions of the parties.89 In other words, there is no kind of constructive trust based on 
expressed common intentions separate from the general English approach to CICTs; the express 
CICT is merely an uncommon variation of the general doctrine. (Whether one should sort the 
common intention trusts into three categories, split between express intentions, inferred intentions 
and imputed intentions, is immaterial here.) 
  
85  Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 (HL). 
86  Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 (HL). 
87  Lloyd's Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at 132. 
88  See Paul Matthews "The Words Which Are Not There: A Partial History of the Constructive Trust" in 
Charles Mitchell (ed) Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart, Oxford, 2009) 1 at 46–47; and Grant v 
Edwards [1986] Ch 638 (CA) at 647 (common intention is a "rarer class of case"). 
89  Nicola Peart "Towards a Concept of Family Property in New Zealand" (1996) 10 IJLPF 105 at 113–114. 
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If it is accepted that the English jurisprudence of CICTs can be seen as split internally between 
the express and extended CICTs, there is a new way of arguing against the High Court's approach to 
the CICT in Harvey, which appears to draw on the English CICT approach as it exists in the 
contemporary authorities.90 On this view, the inapplicability of the recent statements of English law 
in Stack and other cases to the facts in Harvey is not merely due to the lack of contributions of the 
claimant, as the Court of Appeal stated: more fundamentally, it is due to the fact that the law in New 
Zealand is different, because our courts have replaced the CICT approach with the RECT. In 
developing the law during the 1970s and 1980s the New Zealand Court of Appeal viewed the RECT 
approach as a superior development of the English approach – not as a coexisting alternative.91 As 
Professor Atkin commented at the time, the RECT approach "represents a radical departure from the 
language found in the leading English cases".92 Professor Nicola Peart's chapters on "Equity in 
Family Law" in one of the main New Zealand commentaries also suggests this development. She 
argues that "conscious of the constraints and artificiality of the common intention approach, the 
courts in … New Zealand took a different tack".93 In the 2003 edition, Professor Peart discussed 
implied (extended) CICTs on the English model alongside the RECT;94 in 2009 the analysis of the 
English doctrine is presented as different from the New Zealand RECT approach.95 Standard 
applications of constructive trust claims cite Lankow, and sometimes Gillies, rather than Gissing, 
Pettitt and Rosset. 
This, it is suggested, is as it should be, given the shift from the English approach to the RECT. 
The multiplication of substantively equivalent doctrinal approaches to respond to the same situation 
is a recipe for confusion and inconsistency in the application of the law.96 This is not to say that 
there should not be different legal doctrines that apply to different factual situations and events, or 
that some overlap between doctrines in relation to the same events should not be tolerated. Instead, 
the claim is that if different jurisdictions have developed slightly different approaches to the same 
factual events, then it does not make sense for courts to apply each of these approaches as an 
alternative. It would be better to say that the situation of express common intentions should be 
  
90  For example it has been stated that the CICT approach "has been abandoned in comparable jurisdictions": 
Graeme Moffat, Gerry Bean, and Rebecca Probert Trusts Law (5th ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009) at 607. 
91  See the references above at n 20. See also Alastair Hudson and Geraint Thomas The Law of Trusts (2nd ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 814. 
92  Bill Atkin "De Factos Engaging Our Attention" (1988) NZLJ 12 at 13. 
93  Peart, above n 31, at 1199. 
94  At 1202–1205. 
95  At 1198–2108. 
96  See the critique provided in Mee, above n 17, at 292–293. More generally, see Peter Birks "Equity in the 
Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy" (1996) 26 UWAL Rev 1 at 7. 
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understood as decided within the RECT framework where the reasonable expectation is grounded 
on an expressed intention for beneficial sharing.  
Removing the extended CICT approach from New Zealand law is beneficial due to the 
perceived controversy and uncertainty surrounding the English doctrine.97 Even after Stack, the 
nature of the CICT is uncertain.98 Professor Hudson argues:99  
The result of this failure to introduce clarity is that the whole sorry circus of courts at first instance 
taking entirely different approaches to the law will begin again … so that ten years from now we shall 
be trying to identify patterns in another spaghetti of case law.  
Further, the wildly divergent results as between the English Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court's decisions in Jones exemplify the uncertainty; the differences among the judges within the 
Supreme Court in that case is further evidence.100  
The argument above is that the resort to English doctrine is no longer necessary or legally sound 
in New Zealand law; it must be supported with reference to the development of the doctrine in New 
Zealand, to which I shall now turn. 
B The Express CICT in the Formative Court of Appeal Authorities?  
Osborne AJ's view that express CICTs may still exist alongside the RECT has some support in 
authority and commentary. However, with the prevalence of RECT situations, most New Zealand 
decisions have not often been concerned with express CICTs, and so the relationship between these 
doctrines has not been well discussed. The argument presented here is that the express CICT is not 
distinct and complementary to the RECT (Osborne AJ's position), but rather is merely an 
uncommon kind of RECT. What evidence do we find of express intention constructive trusts in the 
development of the New Zealand authority, and are they explained by reference to the English CICT 
approach?  
  
97  Mee, above n 17, at 117; Robin Lister "Equity and Trusts: The International Fallacy? Stack v. Dowden 
[2007] UKHL 17" (2007) 41 Law Teacher 350 at 351; Alastair Hudson Equity and Trusts (8th ed, 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2014) at 708 and 774; and William Swadling "The Common Intention Constructive 
Trust in the House of Lords: An Opportunity Missed" (2007) 123 LQR 511 at 518. 
98  Swadling, above n 97. 
99  Hudson, above n 97, at 774. See also Swadling, above n 97; Martin Dixon "The never-ending story – co-
ownership after Stack v Dowden" [2007] Conv 456; and Simon Gardner and Katherine Davidson "The 
Future of Stack v Dowden" (2011) 127 LQR 13.  
100  See the varying views on how to impute an intention as between the judges in Jones v Kernott, above n 22. 
For discussion see James Brown "Jones v Kernott: Which Road to Rome" (2012) 26 TLI 96; and Man Yip 
"The rules applying to unmarried cohabitants' family home: Jones v Kernott" [2012] Conv 159. 
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The case which is often seen as the starting point for the New Zealand jurisprudence in this area 
is Hayward v Giordani,101 in which Cooke P notes that the English cases of Pettitt and Gissing have 
led to an orthodoxy under which substantial contributions to property, combined with an inferred 
common intention to share beneficial interests, can lead a court to recognise a trust.102 Although he 
did not see fit to choose between identifying it as either "resulting, implied, or constructive", any of 
these being outside of the statutory formality.103 Cooke P felt able to "draw the inference that there 
was a sufficient common intention of equal sharing to give rise to a trust".104 This was separate 
from constructive trusts in which "actual intention could not be inferred" but given the 
circumstances reasonable people would have agreed on beneficial sharing if they had thought about 
it.105 Thus, a distinction was made between trusts arising from an express or inferred actual 
common intention and those that the Court will find in circumstances where despite a lack of actual 
common intention, "flowing from the joint efforts of the parties and reasonable expectations".106 At 
this stage the English express or extended CICT approach continued to dominate, as the RECT 
approach had not yet arisen. 
Discussion of expressed intentions of the parties was also necessary in Gillies due to the 
defendant's clear statements that the claimant would have no right in the defendant's property. 
Cooke P, after considering recent Commonwealth and Court of Appeal jurisprudence concerning the 
courts' ability in de facto relationship disputes to give effect to rights to property that do not mirror 
the legal title, argued that the various doctrinal bases identified took account of the same factors, 
"largely saying much the same thing in different words".107 The President argued that actual 
common intention was not needed,108 although he also agreed with counsel that a constructive trust 
may arise where there is express agreement concerning shared ownership.109 Whatever the doctrine, 
"reasonable expectations in the light of the conduct of the parties are at the heart of the matter", and 
  
101  Hayward v Giordani, above n 15. There is also a detailed discussion of the English jurisprudence in 
Avondale Printers & Stationers Ltd v Haggie [1979] 2 NZLR 124 (SC). 
102  At 143–144.  
103  At 144. 
104  At 145.  
105  At 145–146. 
106  At 148. 
107  Gillies v Keogh, above n 20, at 330. Compare with Fisher J's substitution of similar concepts in describing 
the reasonable expectations approach in Cossey v Bach, above n 43, at 626, and Gault J's approach in 
Lankow v Rose, above n 11, at [289]. A trenchant critique of this logic is provided by Mee, above n 17, at ch 
9. 
108  At 332. 
109  At 333. 
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the relevant conduct identified was the sacrifices of the claimant and contributions of the claimant 
that the defendant takes the benefit of.110 Importantly, is seems that contributions or sacrifice are 
key factors even where there is an expressed intention of shared beneficial ownership.111 The 
language of reasonable expectations had begun to replace the extended CICT and other doctrinal 
bases for intervention,112 but Cooke P does not base this on any particular doctrinal principle. In 
contrast, Richardson J founded his analysis on a "principled basis" with reference to estoppel 
principles.113   
It is in the current landmark,114 Lankow, that the RECT approach replaces the CICT in the sense 
that neither express common intention nor the English jurisprudence play an important role. The key 
features of the new test were the claimant's contribution, alongside the reasonable expectation of an 
interest in the property.115 Tipping J's formula in Lankow has become the canonical statement of the 
requirements of RECTs. He and Hardie-Boys J made unconscionability the foundation for the 
claim,116 and fleshed out the RECT test without basing it exclusively within either estoppel or 
unjust enrichment concepts.117 What is obvious is that the Court of Appeal takes itself to be 
rejecting the English CICT approach to this kind of constructive trust. Tipping J, in the decision 
supported by Gault and McKay JJ, rejected the English focus on express intention or understanding, 
an approach which he characterised as "essentially contractual or quasi-contractual [and] 
unnecessarily artificial".118 The Court also sought to state the law as clearly as possible; as Hardie-
Boys J stated in Lankow, "it is important that whatever the legal rubric there should be clear criteria 
for the imposition of constructive trusts in the area of de facto relationships".119 While concurring 
with Tipping J's decision, Gault J preferred the Canadian unjust enrichment approach (though he 
stated that a claim could have equally been made through estoppel, inferred common intention or 
unconscionability).120 
  
110  At 331. 
111  At 333–334.  
112  See this use of the RECT in Phillips v Phillips, above n 20.  
113  Gillies v Keogh, above n 20, at 344 and 347. 
114  See for example Horsfield v Giltrap (2001) 20 FRNZ 404 (CA) at [20], citing Tipping J's decision. 
115  Lankow v Rose, above n 11, at 294 per Tipping J and at 282 per Hardie-Boys J. 
116  At 294 per Tipping J and at 281 per Hardie-Boys J. 
117  At 293–294 per Tipping J and at 282 per Hardie Boys J. 
118  At 293. 
119  At 282. 
120  At 289 per Gault J. 
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In the landmark authorities in this area, the English CICT approach is replaced by the RECT 
approach. It is, however, clear that the RECT would be satisfied in circumstances where an express 
common intention existed alongside the other requirements.121 It would of course be odd to use the 
terminology of "reasonable expectations" where there were actual expressed intentions: reasonable 
expectations are used to ascertain the existence and content of equitable interests in the absence of 
expressed intentions. Whatever we call the situation, the requirement of contributions seems 
unquestionable: it features in the statements of law in each of the cases discussed above. In Harvey 
the claimant would have to argue that the extended CICT remains outside the RECT analysis, and – 
despite the importance of detriment/contribution in the English and New Zealand authority – that 
contributions to the property are not required. Can this interpretation be founded in New Zealand 
case law, despite the above analysis of the Court of Appeal's development of the RECT?  
C The Survival of the Express CICT?  
There are still indications in the case law that the RECT has not become the exclusive kind of 
constructive trust claim relating to informal property rights in New Zealand. In a line of cases on 
which Osborne AJ drew on in deciding Harvey (HC), it has been said that when express common 
intentions with respect to beneficial ownership have been set down, it is not necessary to determine 
what the reasonable expectations of the parties were.122 But these cases have usually been decided 
on other grounds – meaning that a brief mention of the express CICT has not been accompanied by 
any discussion of a requirement of contribution or detriment – and a detailed discussion and 
clarification in the higher courts has not occurred.  
It is also arguable that expressed intentions of beneficial ownership should be recognised only 
through express trusts or through the dominant RECT, the New Zealand law having moved on from 
the English CICT approach. The case that later courts have focused on when identifying a CICT that 
sits alongside the RECT is Cossey, decided in 1992 between Gillies and Lankow. There Fisher J – 
who had written a commentary on family property123 – sought to "set out the core principles of 
Gillies v Keogh" as they should apply to de facto property disputes in general.124 The express 
intentions of the parties as to beneficial interests were identified as determinative: if the parties had 
by their words or conduct "expressed their own proprietary formula" this was "the end of the 
matter".125 Although these comments were obiter,126 this reasoning seems most influential on 
  
121  Arguably this describes the position of Cooke P in Gormack v Scott [1995] NZFLR 289 (CA) at 293–294.  
122  Gormack v Scott, above n 121; Horsfield v Giltrap [2000] NZFLR 1047 (HC); Boys v Calderwood HC 
Auckland CIV-2004-404-290, 14 June 2005 at [96]–[98]; SM v MH, above n 53, at [44]; and Coffey v 
Coffey [2012] NZHC 1765 at [110]–[111]. 
123  RL Fisher Fisher on Matrimonial Property (2nd ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1984).  
124  Cossey v Bach, above n 43, at 627 per Fisher J.  
125  At 627. 
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Osborne AJ's view that detriment may not be required: Fisher J places doubt on statements of Cooke 
P in Gillies that contribution or detriment is required for a claim to be made out.127 
However Fisher J's argument is not entirely clear on the distinction between constructive trusts 
and express trusts – as was observed in SM v MH.128 He stated that where a couple "clearly evinced 
a common intention that the property be beneficially owned by them in equal shares, this overtook 
any alternative arguments founded upon constructive trusts or contributions".129 The Judge further 
explains that a common intention as to beneficial ownership will have to be agreed on where both 
partners have a disposing interest in the property, but that it is also "always open to the owner of the 
property to unilaterally settle an interest upon the other".130 This suggests a distinction between 
"express common intention" situations and the reasonable expectation approach, but without 
explaining whether the former is an express or constructive trust. In summarising the position, 
Fisher J identifies three distinct categories: (a) unequivocal expressed intentions that are common or 
held by the person with disposing power over the property; (b) unilateral expressed intentions by the 
person with disposing power over the property; and (c) reasonable expectation constructive 
trusts.131 With respect, the reasoning behind these categories is not entirely clear, but there is at least 
some support for the continued existence of express CICTs.  
Beyond Cossey, the judicial analysis of the express CICT sitting alongside the RECT is sparse 
and usually obiter comment in lower courts – in other words, it is of little support for the English 
express CICT remaining in New Zealand. This can be seen in the decisions cited by Osborne AJ: 
 In X v Y, an express trust was found on the facts, with the idea of express common 
intentions falling under this head.132 An alternative constructive trust claim was set out 
with reference only to the RECT approach as found in New Zealand authorities.133  
 The existence of a "common intention trust" was accepted in the unreported case Boys v 
Calderwood.134 The requirements of such a trust were set out simply by reference to Fisher 
  
126  As noted in Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [24]. 
127  Cossey v Bach, above n 43, at 627–628. 
128  SM v MH, above n 53, at [44]. 
129  Cossey v Bach, above n 43, at 627. 
130  At 628. 
131  At 631–632. 
132  X v Y HC Auckland M100/95, 28 November 1995 at 32–39 per Penlington J.  
133  At 39–43.  
134  Boys v Calderwood, above n 122, at [96]–[98]. 
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J's decision in Cossey,135 and the discussion does not clearly refer to the English CICT 
approach as opposed to express trusts.   
 As has been noted, in SM v MH it is not clear whether the trust identified as arising due to 
"unequivocal expressed intention" is seen as an express trust or a constructive trust.136 The 
English authority is not discussed. The formality requirement for trusts of land, which 
seems to apply to the right of occupation of a house that was the subject matter of the 
trust.137 The ambiguity and lack of analysis gives this decision little weight in showing that 
express CICTs remain in New Zealand. 
 In the High Court's decision in LG v MER,138 Wild J identified the "common intention 
constructive trust" as based in the common intentions – express or inferred from conduct – 
as the beneficial ownership of property.139 The constructive trust claim involved was 
characterised as that discussed by Mahon J in Avondale Printers & Stationers v Haggie;140 
however, the kind of claim discussed in that case generally arises where property is 
transferred on the basis that such beneficial ownership would exist, and it would be 
equitable fraud if this interest was not recognised.141 Although Wild J also cited English 
text and authority for the CICT, the "receipt after undertaking" constructive trust is 
different from the English CICT. Therefore this decision also does not provide sound 
support the existence of the express CICT.   
 In Clark v Clark, Asher J seems to say that the express CICT could be recognised in New 
Zealand:142 
… there is a type of constructive trust which does turn on common intention. The relevant intention is 
that which each party manifests by their words and conduct, notwithstanding that for one reason or 
another an express trust is not formed. … While it is possible to infer a constructive trust in these 
circumstances from conduct, the express words of the parties, if proven, will be highly relevant.  
The cases cited for this proposition were English – they were the "trusts of family homes" 
decisions, although Cooke P's reasoning in Gormack v Scott is consistent with this point.143 It may 
  
135  At [97]. 
136  SM v MH, above n 53, at [44].  
137  At [55]. 
138  LG v MER [2010] NZFLR 1001 (HC). 
139  At [91]. 
140  Avondale Printers & Stationers Ltd v Haggie, above n 101.  
141  LG v MER, above n 138, at [91]. See Avondale Printers & Stationers Ltd v Haggie, above n 101, at 163. 
142  Clark v Clark [2012] NZHC 3159, [2013] NZFLR 534 at [54]. 
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be that the Judge thought this a stand-alone case of constructive trust, arising without any 
contribution. He observes that an express trust that fails due to lack of conformity with formalities 
can be upheld as an express trust – again without any reference to contributions or detriment.144 
Asher J seems to treat RECTs arising in de facto relationships as a separate kind of trust, and there 
he states that a contribution to the property must be shown.145 It is the latter claim that succeeds in 
the case,146 and the prior discussions of constructive trusts should be regarded as obiter (that are not 
fully analysed).   
Some post-Lankow Court of Appeal decisions that mention express common intention have also 
been decided on the RECT approach, and without clear discussion of the basis and relationship of 
these approaches.147 In light of the lack of clear higher court support for the continuing existence of 
a separate express CICT founded in the current English law, the Court of Appeal in Harvey (CA) 
might have been bolder: the express CICT does not exist in New Zealand law, and situations where 
there is an express intention to share property beneficially should be argued as either an express 
trust or RECT. The New Zealand courts moved away from the English approach to the RECT, and 
there is no reason to go back to the old doctrine where there is an express common intention, for this 
situation falls within the "indigenous" doctrine. The decisions that recognise the importance of 
expressed intentions work within the logic of the new doctrine.  
D The Contribution/Detriment Requirement  
In addition to the Court of Appeal doubting that a distinction between the CICT and the RECT 
should be drawn, its main dispute with the High Court decision was on whether contributions or 
other detrimental reliance was a requirement for the imposition of a constructive trust where there is 
a common intention or reasonable expectations that one has an interest in another's property. The 
reason that prevented Osborne AJ from granting summary judgment to Reverend Harvey was the 
doubt that he found in the New Zealand law (of CICTs) concerning a requirement of contribution to 
the property or detrimental reliance: neither of these was asserted in a form that would have 
grounded a claim in terms of a RECT or proprietary estoppel. But Osborne AJ observed that in the 
case of the express CICT, such requirements were not unequivocally found in the cases. 
Because of what he sees as the lack of discussion of the requirements of the CICT in New 
Zealand authority or commentary, particularly concerning whether there is a requirement of 
  
143  Gormack v Scott, above n 121, at 293: "Where there has been an express common intention applicable to the 
circumstances that have arisen, it is unnecessary to fall back on reasonable expectations." 
144  Clark v Clark, above n 142, at [55], citing Pennington v Waine, above n 68. 
145  At [56]. 
146  At [57] and following.  
147  Gormack v Scott, above n 121; and Horsfield v Giltrap, above n 122. 
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contribution or detriment, Osborne AJ looks to the English authorities.148 There the Associate Judge 
does find requirement of detriment, which he sees as doctrinally sound, because:149 
… in the absence of such, the unconscionability or fraud on the statute which justifies the Court 's 
upholding of constructive trusts will be absent. If something in the nature of detriment is not required, it 
is arguable that the Court would be unjustifiably enforcing an express trust which was not documented 
in writing. 
Here is a clear recognition that the orthodox view of the English CICT approach requires 
contribution or detriment, which has been supported in most of the authority150 and commentary.151 
While in the most recent developments of the law of extended CICTs the requirement of detriment 
is not explicitly stated,152 it is arguable that Stack neither explicitly overruled the prior law on this 
point nor created a test that did not require detriment.153 The detriment requirement is supported by 
recent judicial pronouncements, including the Court of Appeal decision in Smith v Bottomley154 and 
  
148  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [49]. 
149  At [49]. 
150  See Gissing v Gissing, above n 86, at 905 per Lord Diplock; Lloyd's Bank v Rosset, above n 87, at 132–133 
per Lord Bridge; Grant v Edwards, above n 88, at 654. Midland Bank v Dobson [1986] 1 FLR 171 (CA); 
and Yaxley v Gotts [2000] Ch 162 (CA) at 176. 
151  For example see John Mee "Joint Ownership, Subjective Intention and the Common Intention Constructive 
Trust" [2007] Conv 14; Nick Hopkins "The Pallant v Morgan Equity" [2002] Conv 35; Brian Sloan 
"Keeping Up With the Jones Case: Establishing Constructive Trusts in 'Sole Legal Owner' Scenarios" 
(2015) 35 LS 226 at 228–229; John Randall "Proprietary estoppel and the common intention constructive 
trust – Strange bedfellows or a match in the making?" (2010) 4 J Eq 1 at 37–39; Matthews, above n 88, at 
47–48; John Mowbray and others "Trusts Arising on the Acquisition of Property" in Lewin on Trusts (18th 
ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008) 289 at 321 and 330; Halsbury's Laws of England (online ed, 2013) 98 
"Trusts and Powers" at [117];  Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray Elements of Land Law (5th ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 869–870 and 882–888; Robert Pearce, John Stephens and Warren Barr 
The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 313–314, 
337–338 and 371–374; Webb and Akkouh, above n 24, at 210–211; and Hudson and Thomas, above n 91, 
at 816 and 1518–1519. 
152  Virgo, above n 24, at 325 and 329; Gardner, above n 24, at 434–435; and Etherton, above n 61 at 109–110. 
Compare the Court of Appeal's statement in Harvey (CA), above n 2, at n 29 about the requirement of 
contributions in Jones v Kernott, above n 22; and Stack v Dowden, above n 21. 
153  Hudson, above n 97, at 766; David Fox "Trusts Arising to Enforce an Informally Expressed Intention" in 
John McGhee (ed) Snell's Equity (32nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010) 717 at 747; and Sloan, above 
n 151, at 228–229. See also Neuberger LJ's comments in his dissenting judgment in Stack v Downden, 
above n 21, at [124] regarding the common intention: "… such an intention may be express (although not 
complying with the requisite formalities) or inferred, and must normally be supported by some detriment, to 
justify intervention by equity". 
154  Smith v Bottomley [2013] EWCA Civ 953, [2014] 1 FLR 626 at [31]: detrimental reliance is "a critical 
element of [the] claim to a beneﬁcial interest in the properties in question … by way of constructive trust". 
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the argument of Lewisham LJ in the recent English Court of Appeal decision in Curran v 
Collins:155 
The need for detrimental reliance on the part of the claimant is an essential feature of this kind of case.  
… Although [the claimant's lawyer's] skeleton argument suggested that the need for detrimental reliance 
had been abolished by Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott, she rightly abandoned that argument in the 
course of her oral address. The judge's finding on that point… was that [the claimant] did not in any way 
act to her detriment in reliance on the specious excuse "or at all". That in itself is fatal to [the claimant's] 
case. 
However, as the case was an application for summary judgment, Osborne AJ observed that 
because the New Zealand law of CICTs is not settled, and in light of the reasoning in a number of 
High Court decisions, detriment might not be required in New Zealand, and thus Beveridge might 
have a defence.156  
In contrast, the Court of Appeal found that New Zealand law mirrored the English; without 
contribution or detriment there would be nothing unconscionable in not giving effect to expressed 
common intentions to hold land on trust.157 Even just looking at the New Zealand authority, 
contribution or other detriment was almost always central, as seen in the key Court of Appeal cases: 
Hayward,158 Pasi v Kamana,159 Oliver v Bradley,160 Gillies161 and Lankow.162 Since Lankow, 
Tipping J or Hardie-Boys J's statements of the law have effectively become the test for the RECT, 
and subsequent cases have emphasised the requirement of a contribution.163 Thus, Osborne AJ's 
view that the requirement of detriment is not settled in New Zealand depends on treating the express 
  
155  Curran v Collins [2015] EWCA Civ 404, [2015] Fam Law 780 at [77]–[78]. See also the way in which 
Hong Kong decisions make detrimental reliance a requirement of CICTs, effectively applying the English 
law: Chen Tek Yee v Chan Moon Shing [2015] HKCFI 723; Kwan So Ling v Woo Kee Yiu Harry [2015] 
HKCFI 698; and Mo Ying v Brillex Development Ltd [2015] HKCA 156. 
156  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [50]. 
157  Harvey (CA), above n 2, at [46]  
158  Hayward v Giordani, above n 15, at 143–144. 
159  Pasi v Kamana, above n 20, at 604–605 per Cooke P, at 608 per McMullin J and at 609 per Casey J.  
160  Oliver v Bradley [1987] 1 NZLR 586 at 589–590 per Cooke P. The importance of contributions is implicit 
at 593–594 per Henry J. 
161  Gillies v Keogh, above n 20, at 331 and 333–334 per Cooke P, at 343–347 per Richardson J and at 350–351 
per Bisson J. 
162  Lankow v Rose, above n 11, at 282 per Hardie-Boys J, at 289–290 per McKay J and at 294–295 per Tipping 
J. See also Partridge v Moller HC Invercargill CP 82-87, March 9 1990 at 12.  
163  For example, Smythe v Wadland HC Auckland CIV-2005-404-3459, 16 July 2007 at [82]–[85] per Frater J.  
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CICT as separate from the RECT approach; otherwise, it is clear that contribution or other detriment 
is essential to the claim.  
Commentary on early New Zealand decisions clearly viewed detriment as a requirement before 
equity would intervene.164 Professor Atkin's expansive discussion of the early development of 
English and New Zealand law noted that "proof of common intention will not itself be enough to 
complete the claim for an equitable interest in the property. It will also be necessary to prove that 
the plaintiff acted to his or her detriment."165 Although Professor Peart's recent commentary in 
Equity and Trusts in New Zealand does not mention any requirement of contribution or determine 
when the courts are giving effect to expressed intentions,166 in her earlier discussions of the law the 
requirement of contributions is clear,167 as is evident in the passage that Osborne AJ cites.168 The 
authors of Fisher on Matrimonial and Relationship Property also seem to identify contributions as a 
necessary aspect of giving effect to an informal express trust of land, commenting in the context of 
noting the statutory formality:169   
If, on the strength of an oral declaration of trust by [one party, the other] contributes to the acquisition or 
improvement of property, subsequent acceptance of oral evidence of the trust would seem necessary to 
prevent fraud on the part of the [first party]. 
What, then, of the cases that suggest that contribution is not required? In Harvey (HC) Osborne 
AJ identifies Cossey as the main authority.170 Although Fisher J noted the emphasis on 
contributions in the New Zealand development of the RECT,171 he also identified a common 
intention trust that he said did not rely on contributions,172 and later contrasts the express intention 
situation from constructive trusts, which "require that the claimant has made sacrifices and/or 
contributions in reliance upon the reasonable expectation of an interest in the property".173 Where 
Fisher J referred to Hayward's use of common intentions, he stated that "this overtook any 
  
164  Atkin, above n 92, at 14; JK Maxton "Equity" [1989] NZ Recent L Rev 130 at 134; and Peart, above n 31, at 
1204. 
165  Atkin, above n 7, at 93. 
166  Peart, above n 31, at 1200–1201. 
167  Nicola Peart "A Comparative View of Property Rights in De Facto Relationships: Are We All Driving in 
the Same Direction?" (1989) 7 Otago LR 100 at 103; and Peart, above n 89, at 115. 
168  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [15]. 
169  Fisher, above n 123, at [4.28]. 
170  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [44]. 
171  Cossey v Bach, above n 43, at 626. 
172  At 627–628. 
173  At 628. 
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alternative arguments founded upon constructive trusts or contributions",174 suggesting that 
contributions are irrelevant to an express trust claim. This all suggests an express common intention 
trust sitting alongside the RECT. However, it is not completely clear whether what Fisher J was 
referring to was a CICT: as noted in Harvey (HC), a later judge interpreted Fisher J as referring to 
express trusts.175 Furthermore, in Hayward, Cooke P's statement of the law does require 
contributions, which did exist on the facts.176 Thus Cossey is not a strong authority to show that an 
express CICT does not require contribution or reliance in New Zealand.  
E The Doctrinal Basis 
Ultimately the question of whether contribution or other detrimental reliance is required by New 
Zealand constructive trust doctrine in this area depends on how one reads the development of the 
law as expressed in authority and interpreted in commentary. It was argued above that the English 
CICT approach was rejected in New Zealand, so that express common intentions must instead be 
incorporated into our Court of Appeal's new RECT approach. In any case, the development of the 
reasonable expectation test was based on the fundamental equivalence of proprietary estoppel, 
CICTs and unjust enrichment – each of which responded to contributions or other reliance. With 
respect, the view that a distinctive New Zealand CICT that does not require contribution or other 
reliance may exist has neither much support in principle, nor in the authority and commentaries: 
whether the RECT replaces other approaches or not, all of the possible other claims including the 
CICT require contribution or reliance. The Court of Appeal in Harvey (CA) takes a similar position, 
albeit without providing an in-depth analysis of the various approaches or the relevant case law and 
commentary.   
Why there is a requirement of contributions or detrimental reliance at all is a crucial point, 
because it requires an analysis of the doctrinal basis of the law in this area – which has been said to 
"lack any independent theoretical basis".177 The cause of action that grounds the RECT has always 
been unclear,178 and the Court of Appeal's development of the doctrine denied the need to identify 
any one doctrinal foundation.179  
  
174  At 627. 
175  SM v MH, above n 53, at [44]. 
176  Hayward v Giordani, above n 15, at 144–145. 
177  Mee, above n 17, at 293. See also Simon Gardner's analysis of the doctrinal basis for family property 
decisions in Simon Gardner "Rethinking Family Property" (1993) 109 LQR 263; and Gardner, above n 24. 
178  Rickett "Causes of Action and Remedies: Getting it Clear!" (1994) NZLJ 207; and Peart, above n 31, at 
1205. 
179  See discussion above at Part IV:B: The Express CICT in the Formative Court of Appeal Authorities?; and 
Mee, above n 17, at ch 9. 
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1 Giving effect to the informal express trust? 
One option that cannot be accepted is that a constructive trust arises in response merely to a 
common intention that the beneficial rights in the property be held on trust – a situation that might 
create an express trust if it were not for the signed writing formality.180 As Penner puts it: "Why, if a 
common intention to share property is proved or inferred from all the evidence, does this not operate 
as an effective declaration of trust, albeit an informal one?"181 Whether the formality rule should be 
avoided is questionable; it has reasons behind it.182 As the Court of Appeal observes,183 to bypass 
the formality simply by saying that an informal declaration of trust is effective as a constructive 
trust if the beneficiary also intends to benefit from it will allow many other claimants to make this 
argument. This would virtually destroy the formality rule.184  
Osborne AJ recognised in Harvey (HC) that there was a tension between expressed intention 
trusts of land and the formality.185 However, he said the express CICT was different from the 
express trust: "The concept of a trust obligation created by the unilateral intention of the legal owner 
… is by its nature fundamentally different to the common intention constructive trust invoked by Mr 
Beveridge in this case."186 However the fundamental difference is not explained further. Explaining 
the relevant intention later, the Associate Judge cites an Australian text that observes: "Proof of a 
real intention on the part of the title-holder that the party seeking relief was to have a beneficial 
interest is needed to found the Court's jurisdiction to prevent unconscionable reliance on legal 
rights."187 This could be found in written or oral statements or inferred from the parties' actions in 
the circumstances.188 But again this shows that the "settlor" has requisite intention to hold their 
property on trust for the claimant, which is all that is required to satisfy the "certainty of intention" 
requirement for an express trust. The "common" aspect of the express CICT might provide some 
distinction from the express trust, but it is not clear how except by reference perhaps to detrimental 
  
180  Fisher, above n 123, at [4.8]. For observations about the role of the CICT in avoiding the formality 
requirements, see Gino Dal Pont "Equity's Chameleon – Unmasking the Constructive Trust" (1997) 16 Aust 
Bar Rev 46 at 65–70. James Penner The Law of Trusts (9th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 
113 and 120. The relevant English provision is s 53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (UK). 
181  Penner, above n 180, at 113. See also Moffat, Bean and Probert, above n 90, at 607. 
182  See Ben McFarlane The Structure of Property Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) at 99–111; and Patricia 
Critchley "Taking Formalities Seriously" in Susan Bright and John Dewar (eds) Land Law: Themes and 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) 507. 
183  Harvey (CA), above n 2, at [47]. 
184  Gardner, above n 24, at 435. 
185  At [13]. 
186  At [30]. 
187  At [38]. 
188  At [39]. 
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reliance; the simple fact that the intended beneficiary knows of the failed trust does not give rise to 
unconscionability, and to hold otherwise would be to subvert the formality.  
2 Fraud on the statute 
The same reasoning can be applied to suggestions that the express CICT should be seen as 
drawing on the venerable doctrine that formality rules should not themselves be used to perpetrate a 
fraud.189 The root of the modern doctrine is Rochefoucauld v Boustead.190 This line of cases holds 
that statutory formality rules should not apply where it was clear that a beneficial interest was 
intended by the parties, and the defendant's not recognising that interest can be characterised as a 
fraud on the statute.191 This idea has been identified by some commentators as the possible 
foundation of the express CICT and the RECT.192  
However, this doctrine is quite different to the usual CICT/RECT situation, for it is most 
commonly used in circumstances where land or other property is acquired by the defendant on the 
understanding that a beneficial interest in the property be recognised in favour of the donor or 
another person.193 The situations covered by this doctrine are not analogous to one in which a 
person owns property themselves and either self-declares a trust or acts in a way to give another a 
  
189  Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133 (CA); Hodgson v Marks [1971] Ch 892 (CA); and Penner, above 
n 180, at 120. See also Allen v Snyder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685 (NSW CA). 
190  Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196 (CA).  
191  McCormick v Grogan (1869) LR 4 HL 82 (HL); Bannister v Bannister, above n 189; Binnion v Evans 
[1972] 1 Ch 379; Peychers v Peychers [1955] NZLR 564 (SC); Avondale Printers & Stationers v Haggie, 
above n 101; Crampton-Smith v Crampton-Smith [2011] NZCA 308, [2012] 1 NZLR 5 at [57]. See the 
various recent academic analyses of these trusts: Simon Gardner "Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts" in 
Charles Mitchell (ed) Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart, Oxford, 2009) 63; Matthews, above n 88, at 
21 and following; Ying Khai Liew "The Secondary-Rights Approach to the 'Common Intention 
Constructive Trust'" [2015] Conv 210; and Ben McFarlane "Constructive Trusts Arising on a Receipt of 
Property Sub Conditione" (2004) 120 LQR 667. 
192  This view is found LG v MER, above n 138, at [91]–[92], which is cited by Osborne AJ in Harvey (HC), 
above n 2, at [29].  See Peart, above n 167, at 103, 110–111, 128, 133–134; and Nicola Peart and Graeme 
Austin "Equity in Family Law" in Andrew Butler (ed) Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (Brookers, 
Wellington, 2003) 1179 at 1206; and Peart, above n 31, at 1205. See also Darryn Jensen "Rehabilitating the 
Common Intention Trust" (2004) 23 UQLJ 54 at 64-65; and MP Thompson "Constructive Trusts and Non-
binding Agreements" [2001] Conv 265.  
193  Avondale Printers & Stationers v Haggie, above n 101, at 162–163 per Mahon J; Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) 
(1988) 164 CLR 604 at [15]; Ispt Nominees Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] NSWSC 
697 at [329]–[336]; and Lincu v Krnjulac [2014] NSWSC 532 at [53]. See the various similar general 
discussion of the nature of trusts in the Rochefoucauld-type situations in Nick Hopkins "Conscience, 
Discretion, and the Creation of Property Rights" (2006) 26 LS 475; Hopkins, above n 151; Gardner, above n 
191, at 68–70; McFarlane, above n 191; Virgo, above n 24, at 120–123; and Fox, above n 153, at 739–740. 
Mee, above n 17, at 158 makes a similar argument against the use of Rochefoucauld reasoning to found the 
English CICT.  
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reasonable expectation of an interest in the property, and Rochefoucauld and similar cases are not 
prominent in the relevant English or New Zealand authority or commentary relating to constructive 
trusts in relationship property contexts. Furthermore, some commentators have identified 
detrimental reliance as the justification for the doctrine in this area;194 Professor Simon Gardner 
provides a theory of these cases of constructive trust as arising to oblige the defendant "to make 
good the loss that X [the claimant] would otherwise suffer when, in reasonable reliance on Y [the 
defendant's] undertaking to allow a right in some property which is or comes to be in the Y's hands, 
X foregoes an opportunity to bring this right about in some other way".195 This explanation of the 
"fraud on the statute" trusts does not apply to most CICT/RECT situations. However, it may be 
argued that these doctrines share the same justificatory foundations,196 as will be briefly suggested 
below. 
3 Emphasising the contribution or detrimental Reliance basis: estoppel or unjust 
enrichment 
The basis for the claim in CICTs and RECTs is unconscionable behaviour by the owner of 
property in relation to someone else who has, in the course of the parties' dealings or relationship, 
come to expect an interest in the defendant's property. Although the situations of transfer subject to 
an undertaking or condition (discussed in the section above) are different from most of those falling 
under the CICT/RECT doctrines, arguably they are linked by a justificatory basis in preventing 
detrimental reliance, including contributions to another's property. For while the doctrinal basis for 
CICT/RECTs is controversial and often not fully explained, it is commonly identified as either a 
form of, or analogous to, estoppel or unjust enrichment.  
Despite the continuing developments and controversy in the English law, a common doctrinal 
explanation of CICTs remains that the reliance on an expectation of an interest is what makes it 
unconscionable for the defendant to cause detriment by not giving effect to the common 
intention.197 Where there is an express agreement or undertaking regarding the family home, the 
detriment requirement is what saves the arrangement from merely being an unenforceable express 
trust.198 In England, the idea of detrimental reliance has been dominant from the beginning of the 
  
194  Simon Gardner An Introduction to the Law of Trusts (3rd ed, Clarendon, Oxford, 2011) at 97 and 328–334; 
McFarlane, above n 191; and Ying Khai Liew "Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897)" in Charles Mitchell and 
Paul Mitchell (eds) Landmark Cases in Equity (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 423. 
195  Gardner, above n 191, at 79. 
196  Jensen, above n 192, at 64–65. 
197  Matthews, above n 88, at 46–50. See also Liew, above n 191. 
198  Gray and Gray, above n 151, at 890; Fox, above n 153, at 749; Gardner, above n 194, at 339; Jill E Martin 
Hanbury and Martin: Modern Equity (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012) at 298;  Denis SK Ong 
Trusts Law in Australia (4th ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 2012) at 594–595; David Hayton 
"Constructive trusts of homes – a bold approach" (1993) 109 LQR 485; and Etherton, above n 61, at 125. 
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CICT,199 with English authority and commentary commonly being premised on the claimant 
showing detrimental reliance on the common intention as to beneficial ownership of the property.200  
Similarly, the New Zealand Court of Appeal's approach can be seen as founded on detrimental 
reliance in the form of contributions to the property; alternatively one might emphasise the New 
Zealand doctrine's reference to contributions and reasonable expectations, which draw on the 
Canadian jurisprudence of unjust enrichment.201 While the choice of doctrinal foundation will make 
a difference to outcomes in some cases due to the nature of that doctrine, it seems clear that the 
explanation of unconscionability in the CICT/RECT depends on detrimental reliance. Something 
more is needed than mere common intentions, expressed or not. At least this is the view arrived at 
here after the above analysis of the development of the New Zealand doctrine in light of its roots in 
English authority and its possible doctrinal foundations. Although this author respectfully disagrees 
with Osborne AJ's similar analysis in Harvey (HC), I join him in saying that the New Zealand 
authority and commentary does not speak unequivocally on the nature of constructive trust claims in 
this area, including whether there is any requirement for contribution or other detrimental reliance.  
V CONCLUSION  
The law relating to equity's recognition of informal beneficial rights to property has always 
raised difficult conceptual questions; clearly analysing them and charting the preferred path forward 
is the task of courts and commentators, not to mention lawyers advising their clients. The 
development of New Zealand law relating to the availability of constructive trusts in relationship 
property disputes has, it is respectfully submitted, suffered from its refusal to clearly choose and 
justify a doctrinal path to achieving practical justice between parties. This resulted in the High Court 
decision in Harvey (HC) that found the law uncharted and equivocal, followed by the Court of 
Appeal reversal that claimed that the law was settled, but without discussing in any substantial way 
the doctrinal points made below. We now know that such constructive trust claims require 
contributions or other detrimental reliance, but how this is reconciled or opposed to the authorities 
cited by Osborne AJ is not discussed by the Court of Appeal.  
  
199  Gissing v Gissing, above n 86, at 905 per Lord Diplock; Lloyd's Bank v Rosset, above n 87, at 132–133 per 
Lord Bridge; Grant v Edwards, above n 88; and Austin v Keele (1987) 61 ALJR 605 (PC). See Matthews, 
above n 197, at 46–50. 
200  Mee, above n 17, at 141; and McFarlan, above n 198, at 614. 
201  See Petkus v Becker [1980] SCR 834; Sorochan v. Sorochan [1986] 2 SCR 38; and Peter v Beblow [1993] 1 
SCR 980. For discussion see Mitchell McInnes "A Return to First Principles in Unjust Enrichment: Kerr v 
Baranow" (2011) 51 Can Bus LJ 275; Mee, above n 17, at ch 7; and Chambers, above n 1. For suggestions 
that unjust enrichment might replace the current English approach, see Etherton, above n 24; Gardner, 
above n 177; and Gardner, above n 24. For the identification of the New Zealand approach as using unjust 
enrichment concepts, see Mowbray and others, above n 151, at 332. 
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Stepping back, it seems that the difficulty in this law is the result of the equivocality of its 
development. In his detailed comparative and doctrinal analysis of approaches to The Property 
Rights of Cohabitees, published in 1999, John Mee argued that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's 
development of the law in relation to de facto property disputes was problematic in these respects 
due to its refusal to identify and analyse any one doctrinal approach:202 
… the New Zealand courts have taken a distinctly anti-theoretical approach, concentrating firmly on the 
instrumentalist goal of achieving a broad adjustive discretion. Their willingness to view all the other 
doctrines as co-extensive is … explicable on the basis that their focus is primarily on the results 
generated by the doctrines. … [D]etrimental consequences have followed from the failure to channel 
intellectual resources … into working out fully the parameters of any one theory. … [A] number of 
points of uncertainty … might have been cleared up if a doctrinal basis had been identified and worked 
through. 
While this law is more the exception than the rule in resolving de facto relationship property 
disputes, it would still be worthwhile for the courts to clarify it in a way that makes sense of its 
historical development and shows its continuing place in a coherent New Zealand doctrinal system. 
The uncertainty that is found in the High Court in Harvey (HC) concerning the detriment 
requirement, and the lack of analysis of the relationship between the New Zealand approach and the 
English CICT jurisprudence, could have been remedied by the Court of Appeal agreeing on one 
established doctrinal basis, or providing a more detailed analysis of law. While such a systematic 
analysis of the New Zealand law in this area was not necessary to resolve Harvey, some further 
explanation would have been welcomed, as these issues do need to be resolved if the law is to be 
clear and coherent. Although the Court of Appeal in Harvey (CA) was not sure that it is correct "that 
a distinction should be drawn between constructive trusts based on 'reasonable expectations' and 
'common intention' constructive trusts",203 Osborne AJ demonstrated that such a distinction is 
suggested by some New Zealand authority and commentary. While there are other pressing 
demands on judicial time and energy, explaining whether this is so, and why, would be an important 
contribution to clarifying the doctrinal basis of the constructive trust in New Zealand. 
  
202  Mee, above n 17, at 267 and 292. 
203  Harvey (HC), above n 2, at [46]. 
